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shire may be the first jurisdiction in this country to totally abrogate
the immunity doctrine. Although a narrow reading of the decision
would limit it to the facts before the court, the implications of the
case suggest the total destruction of the parental immunity doctrine.
LAWRENCE S. ALLEN
LABOR LAW - FEDERAL PREEMPTION - UNION'S DUTY
OF FAIR REPRESENTATION
Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
The proper forum in which a discharged employee can assert
a cause of action against his union for breach of the fiduciary obli-
gation to fairly represent him' has been the subject of much recent
commentary.2 The choice of the forum by the employee and his
1 The statutory duty of fair representation was developed in Steele v. Louisville
N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944), in which the Court reasoned that a grant of power to act
on behalf of others requires the assumption to act fairly on their behalf. Id. at 202. The
Court construed the Railway Labor Act § 1, 45 U.S.C. § 151 (1964), as reflecting con-
gressional intent to impose upon the bargaining representative a duty to act "without
hostile discrimination, fairly, impartially, and in good faith." 323 U.S. at 204. Section 2
of the Railway Labor Act provides that "employees shall have the right to organize and
bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing." 45 U.S.C. § 152
(1964).
Subsequently, this same standard was applied to those unions who derived their au-
thority under the National Labor Relations Act § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159 (a) (1964)
which provides in part:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargain-
ing by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes,
shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the
purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of
employment ....
In Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248 (1944), Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345
U.S. 330 (1953), and Syres v. Oil Workers Local 23, 350 U.S. 892, rev'g 223 F.2d
739 (5th Cir. 1955), the Court, relying on Steele, found the duty implicit in section
9(a). Until its decision in Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforce-
ment denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963), the NLRB had refused to take jurisdic-
tion of fair representation suits. In Miranda Fuel, the Board found that congressional
legislation permitted it to exercise fair representation jurisdiction and reasoned that
section 7 of the Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 29 U.S.C. § 157
(1964) [hereinafter cited as LMRA], gives employees "the right to be free from unfair
or invidious treatment by their exclusive bargaining agent in matters affecting their
employment." 140 N.LR.B. at 185. Thus traditional section 9 rights were absorbed
into section 7 and became enforceable through section 8(b) (1) (a) of the LMRA. In
addition, the Board has found violations of the fair representation duty that are imposed
by sections 8(b) (3) and 8(d) of the same Act. See, e.g., Galveston Marine Ass'n,
148 N.LR.B. 897, 899 (1964). Since both the courts and the NIRB have exercised
jurisdiction of fair representation suits, a problem of federal preemption has thereby
developed.
2 See, e.g., Cox, The Duty of Fair Representation, 2 VILL- L. REV. 151 (1957);
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power to so choose have important consequences for the employer,
the union, the individual worker, and, ultimately, the general public.
The recent decision of Vaca v. Sipes8 by the United States Supreme
Court concerns the jurisdiction of a union member's suit against his
union for its failure to properly represent him in his dispute with
the employer.
Benjamin Owens, a member of Kansas City Local 12 of the
National Brotherhood of Packinghouse Workers, was discharged
by his employer, Swift & Company, because of poor health.4" Al-
though the union participated in the first four steps of the grievance
procedure, it declined to take the final step, the arbitration process,
because it believed that Owens' claim lacked merit.5 Thereupon,
Owens brought two suits: one against his employer for breach of
contract and the other against the union for wrongful discharge and
failure to process his grievance through arbitration.6
The union suit was brought as a class action against the mem-
bership of the national and local union. The state trial court set aside
the jury's verdict for plaintiff for actual and punitive damages, rea-
soning that the federal government had vested jurisdiction of the
subject matter in the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).
The state appellate court affirmed the decision,' but the Missouri
Supreme Court reinstated the jury verdict, holding that jurisdiction
of the subject matter by state courts was not preempted by federal
legislation.' In addition, the court found sufficient evidence to sup-
port Owens' assertion that he had a meritorious claim against Swift,
Rosen, Fair Representation, Contract Breach and Fiduciary Obligations, 15 HASTiNGS
L.J. 391 (1964); Van Zile, The Cornponential Structure of Labor-Management Con-
tractual Relationships, 43 U. DEr. LJ. 321 (1966); Wellington, Union Democracy
and Fair Representation: Federal Responsibility in a Federal System, 67 YALE L.J. 1327
(1958); Note, Labor Law: Section 301 and the Union's Duty of Fair Representation,
12 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1238 (1965), Note, Refusal to Process a Grievance, the NLRB
and the Duty of Fair Representation; 26 U. PrT. L. REv. 593 (1965); Note, Federal
Protection of Individual Rights Under Labor Contracts, 73 YAIE L.J. 1215 (1964);
32 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 402 (1963); 65 MIcH. L REv. 373 (1966); 42 TEXAS L.
REV. 917 (1964).
3 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
4 Id. at 175.
rThe union suggested rehabilitation after conferring with the employer, but Owens
offered medical testimony from his family physician and an independent doctor that he
was fit to work. Id.
6 Sipes v. Vaca, 397 S.W.2d 658 (Mo. 1965), rev'd, 386 U.S. 171 (1967). The
suit against Swift for breach of contract was pending in the state court at the pretrial
stage at the time of the Court's decision. 386 U.S. at 176 n.4.
7 Sipes v. Vaca, 397 S.W.2d 658 (Mo. 1965), rev'd, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
81d. at 664. The court relied on International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356
U.S. 617 (1958), to uphold state jurisdiction. 397 S.W.2d at 664.
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thus reflecting the union's bad faith in refusing to carry Owens'
grievance to arbitration.?
Granting certiorari," the United States Supreme Court was thus
faced with the issues of whether congressional legislation had pre-
empted a union member's damage suit against union officers based
on their wrongful failure to seek arbitration of his grievance, and,
if not, whether a state court in determining union liability is bound
by federal standards."
Although the Court held that the subject matter was not pre-
empted by federal legislation 2 and that federal standards must be
applied,' 3 the former aspect of the decision has greater significance.
9 397 S.W.2d at 665. The Supreme Court emphasized that the state court had at-
tributed "bad faith" to the union on the mere showing of a wrongful discharge by the
employer, "regardless of the union's good faith in reaching a contrary conclusion." 386
U.S. at 189-90.
10 Vaca v. Sipes, 384 U.S. 969 (1966).
11See 386 U.S. at 171.
12 Id. at 177.
13 Id. at 193. It is apparent that the federal law should have been applied by the
state court, since the alleged union wrong was governed by federal statutes. See note 1
supra; Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1963); Ford Motor Co. v. Huff-
man, 345 U.S. 330 (1953). In holding that the employee must show evidence that "a
Union's conduct toward a member of the collective bargaining unit is arbitrary, discrim-
inatory or in bad faith," the Court has correctly adopted the federal standard and appears
to have correctly applied it to the facts of the Vaca case. 386 U.S. at 189. In Steele,
the Court emphasized the union's duty to put forth an honest effort on behalf of the
employee without hostile discrimination. Note 1 supra. See also Ford Motor Co. v.
Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 337 (1953). Furthermore, the Huff!man Court noted that
the union is entitled to a wide range of reasonableness in its exercise of discretion, sub-
ject to good faith and honesty of purpose. Id. at 338. In Humphrey v. Moore, 375
U.S. 335, 349-50 (1963), the Court reasoned that the union must act honestly and
upon relevant factors. It therefore seems that the Vaca Court could satisfy the Steele
standards in holding that mere proof that the underlying grievance was meritorious is
not sufficient to justify a presumption of bad faith by the union where it actively pro-
cessed the grievance into the fourth step, attempted to gather sufficient evidence to prove
Owens' case, attempted to secure less demanding work for Owens, and finally suggested
rehabilitation. 386 U.S. at 195. Furthermore, there was only controverted testimony
of any hostile discrimination. Id. As the Court well notes, however, had the union
only perfunctorily processed Owens' claim after he had offered medical testimony relat-
ing to his fitness, a breach of duty might have been found. Id. Hence, the Court implies
that evidence which indicates a meritorious claim against the employer might be suf-
ficient to establish a breach of fair representation by the union, with a showing by the
employee of union inactivity at the lower levels of the grievance procedure. Of most
interest in its discussion of the good faith standard is the Court's application of the Huff-
man-Humphrey requirements of honesty of purpose, wide range of reasonableness, and
union action upon relevant factors. The Court notes that a rule which would enable the
employee to take his grievance to arbitration without union approval would undermine
the settlement process established by the employer and the union and would undercut
the union's authority as bargaining agent; thus, the employer would have less confidence
in the union and collective bargaining would be endangered. Furthermore, the union
has a valid stake as to which claims merit arbitration since the cost of the process is
high. Id. at 193. The fact that the union acted upon independent evidence that Owens
FAIR UNION REPRESENTATION
Also of significance was the Court's pronouncement that the em-
ployee must prove bad faith on the part of the union in filing and
pursuing grievances in order to combat the exhaustion of remedies
defense available to the employer in the breach of contract action.
Until the Court's decision in San Diego Building Trades Council
v. Garmon,'4 no broad test had been delineated as to what labor
practices were preempted from state jurisdiction by congressional
legislation.15 In Garmon, the Court held that if activity is arguably
an unfair labor practice, subject to sections 7 or 8 of the Taft-Hart-
ley Act,"0 the NLRB retains exclusive jurisdiction over the subject
matter.
17
It has been suggested that it was not until the decision in
Miranda Fuel Co. 8 that the power of state courts to hear fair repre-
sentation suits, based upon the Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Rail-
was unfit to work seems to satisfy the requirement of acting upon relevant factors. Id.
at 195.
14359 U.S. 236 (1959).
1 5 The problem of federal preemption posed by sections 7 and 8 of the LMRA was
well reflected in decisional law prior to Garmon. The Courts considered congressional
intent as indefinite and incapable of any fixed general rule. See International Ass'n of
Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617, 619 (1958); Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc.,
348 U.S. 468, 480 (1955).
16LMIRA §§ 7, 8, 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158 (1964).
17 San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245 (1959). The
Garmon Court, however, recognized exceptions to the broad preemption rule. Certain
fact situations, such as in International UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958), de-
manded state jurisdiction since the states were legitimately concerned, that is, "where the
regulated conduct touched interests... deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility."
359 U.S. at 244. In addition, state jurisdiction would obtain in cases like International
Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958), since "the activity regulated
was a merely peripheral concern of the Labor Management Relations Act." 359 U.S.
at 243. In Local 100, United Ass'n of Journeymen v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690 (1963),
the Court deemed the Gonzales exception to Garmon as constituting action not con-
cerned directly with employment rights, but only with internal union matters. Thus,
in these two areas, there would be no presumption of administrative preemption unless
expressly declared by Congress and both forms of conduct could be subject to concur-
rent jurisdiction. See 359 U.S. at 244. Additional exceptions to the Garmaon rule were
created by legislative enactment and interpretive decisional law. LMRA § 301(a), 29
U.S.C. § 185 (a) (1964), provides that "suits for violation of contracts between an
employer and a labor organization ... may be brought in any district court of the United
States."
In Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962), the Court construed section
301, holding that the Garmon rule was inapplicable and that state jurisdiction obtained
in a suit brought by an employee against his employer for breach of a discriminatory
contract clause. In Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964), the Court extended
Smith to allow an employee to sue his union and an employer in one state court pro-
ceeding for violation of the collective bargaining agreement, although the conduct could
be considered an unfair labor practice. Thus, under Smith and Humphrey, even if
conduct could arguably be considered an unfair labor practice, state jurisdiction obtains.
In addition, the state courts would apply the applicable federal law.
18 140 N.LR.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
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road Co."9 rationale, was questioned. ° In Miranda Fuel the NLRB
reversed its prior stand and found that a union's breach of the duty
of fair representation was an unfair labor practice and thereby sub-
ject to sections 7 and 8 of the Taft-Hartley Act.2 ' Although
Miranda Fuel was not enforced by the Second Circuit,2 the Fifth
Circuit, in Local 12, United Rubber Workers v. NLRB,' has recent-
ly enforced the Board's finding of an unfair labor practice based
upon a union's discriminatory failure to process a worker's griev-
ance. Thus, the National Labor Relations Board affords machinery
whereby an employee can seek redress for a union's improper con-
duct in handling the grievance procedure if the General Counsel
wishes to assert the jurisdiction of the Board.2" Since the NLRB
could have enforced Owens' claim in the instant case, the question
arose as to whether this possibility preempted the state jurisdiction.
The Court was thus faced with various alternatives: (1) the
state court could have been overruled on the preemption issue and
the Court could have vested sole jurisdiction in the NLRB by refus-
ing to apply any exceptions to the Garmon rule and by so doing ap-
proved the Fifth Circuit's approach in Rubber Workers; (2) con-
current jurisdiction of the subject matter could have been vested by
affirming the state court's reliance on the rationale of International
Association of Machinists v. Gonzales25 so as not to negate Rubber
19323 U.S. 192 (1944).
20 See 65 MICH. L. REV. 373, 374-75 (1966). The author notes that prior to Mir-
anda Fuel, sections 7 and 8 of the LMRA were interpreted by the NLRB itself as dealing
with activities concerning the encouragement or discouragement of union membership,
and not the traditional section 9 breach of fair representation violation. In fact, in
Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953), the Board, in an amicus curiae brief,
expressly denied jurisdiction of these fair representation suits. See 386 U.S. at 180 n.6.
In Garmon, the Court stated, "In the absence of the Board's clear determination that an
activity is neither protected nor prohibited ... it is not for this Court to decide whether
such activities are subject to state jurisdiction." 359 U.S. at 246. See also Cox, supra
note 2, at 174.
2 1 LMRA, §§ 7, 8, 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158 (1964).
22 NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co. 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963). Of the three-judge
panel, only Judge Medina disallowed the Board's assumption of fair representation juris-
diction. Judge Lumbard did not consider whether breach of the duty was an unfair labor
practice, but concurred with Judge Medina in the finding that the NLRB had insufficient
evidence to support its finding of breach of duty. Judge Friendly dissented and agreed
with the NLRB's assumption of jurisdiction and in the finding that the evidence was
sufficient. See 386 U.S. at 198 n.1.
23 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966), enforcing Local 12, United Rubber Workers, 150
N.LR.B. 312 (1964); see 20 Sw. L.J. 937 (1966).
24 He can refuse to institute an unfair labor practice action and his discretion is not
reviewable by the courts. See United Elec. Contractors Ass'n v. Ordman, 336 F.2d 776
(2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1026 (1967).
25 356 U.S. 617 (1958); see notes 8 & 17 supra.
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Workers; (3) the Court could have rejected the Fifth Circuit's ap-
proval of NLRB jurisdiction in the matter and thus negated admin-
istrative jurisdiction, leaving sole jurisdiction to the states; (4) ad-
ministrative jurisdiction could have been sanctioned, thus resolving
the conflict between the Second and Fifth Circuits, while at the
same time state jurisdiction could have been vested by applying the
section 301 exception to Garmon; 6 or (5) the Court could have
avoided the conflict between the circuits, thus leaving the NLRB's
jurisdiction subject to question, but still could have approved juris-
diction by applying section 301 of Taft-Hartley. It appears as if
the last alternative was chosen by the Court in Vaca.
In stating its preemption test, the Court noted that the ultimate
decision "must depend upon the nature of the particular interests
being asserted and the effect upon the administration of national
labor policies of concurrent judicial and administrative remedies." 8
The Court reasoned that although one of the bases of the federal
preemption doctrine is to avoid conflicting rules of substantive law,
the NLRB had itself removed this obstacle by accepting the tradi-
tional Steele concept of the extent of the union's duty.29 Hence,
consistent standards could be obtained from both administrative and
state proceedings. 0
In addition, the Court noted that the traditional "expertise"
argument on behalf of federal preemption3' would be inapplicable
because fair representation suits "often require review of the sub-
2 6 Note 17 supra.
27See 65 Mici-. L REv. 373, 385 (1966) wherein the author discusses these al-
ternatives. See also note 17 supra.
28 386 U.S. at 180.
29 Note 1 supra.
30 386 U.S. at 171. Although the Court stressed the "substantive" aspects of federal
preemption, the decision placed little emphasis on the need to avoid conflicting tri-
bunals that apply this substantive law. In Garmon, the Court quoted from Garner v.
Teamsters Local 776, 346 U.S. 485, 490-91 (1953):
Congress did not merely lay down a substantive rule of law to be enforced
by any tribunal competent to apply law generally to the parties.... A mul-
tiplicity of tribunals and a diversity of procedures are quite as apt to produce
incompatible or conflicting adjudications as are different rules of substantive
law. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 242-43(1959); see Brief for NLRB as Amicus Curiae at 16, Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S.
171 (1967).31 The Board is better equipped to handle fair representation cases than the courts
since it is more familiar with the proper functionings of unions in the industrial relations
area. The courts are institutionally limited and cannot evaluate the wisdom of collec-
tive bargaining agreements. See Cox, supra note 2, at 174; Wellington, supra note 2,
at 1358; Brief for NLRB as Amicus Curiae at 13, Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 181-83
(1967).
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stantive positions taken and policies pursued by a union in its nego-
tiation of a collective bargaining agreement and in its handling of
the grievance machinery ... as these matters are not normally with-
in the Board's unfair labor practice jurisdiction .... .2 Further,
the Court reasoned that vesting sole jurisdiction in the NLRB could
foreclose any remedy for the individual in his suit against the union
because of the General Counsel's unreviewable discretion to institute
the complaint.33
As its final argument to deny federal preemption, the Court
considered the various problems which would occur if an employee
could sue his employer for breach of a contract in a state court,
based upon section 301, but could not litigate the union's breach
of duty in the same tribunal. The Court reasoned that in many
suits against an employer in a state court, the employer could raise
the defense of exhaustion of remedies and it would therefore force
the employee to prove that his union had breached its fair repre-
sentation duty before the employer could be held liable for the
breach of his contract. 4 Although the state court would be per-
mitted to consider the fault of the union in order to sustain the suit
against the employer, the relief could only be obtained against the
employer since the state court would not have obtained jurisdiction
over the union. Hence, the employer would have to pay for the
union's wrong or, if the court awarded only partial recovery, the
aggrieved litigant would be forced to take his fair representation
claim to the NLRB, without a definite chance of recovery due to
the unreviewable discretion of the General Counsel. 5
32 386 U.S. at 181. Although the Court agrees in this respect with the dissenting
Board members in Hughes Tool Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1573, 1584-90 (1964), it is still
doubtful that the Court intended to take away the Board's jurisdiction. Note 40 infra.
But see note 34 infra. The concurring opinion disagrees with this approach, stating
that the NLRB has jurisdiction of the substantive bargaining behavior of the parties in
numerous respects. See 386 U.S. at 202-03 n.5.
33 386 U.S. at 181-83; see note 24 supra & accompanying text. The Court stated that
the "public interest in effectuating the policies of the federal labor laws, not the wrong
done to the individual employee, is always the Board's principal concern in fashioning un-
fair labor practice remedies." 386 U.S. at 182 n.8. The above language seems to say that
the Court could not deny the administrative remedy. The availability of the Board
as an additional forum could only aid the individual litigant. In fact, it has been sug-
gested that the Board reversed itself and assumed jurisdiction of the employee's grievance
complaint since the courts themselves denied remedies to the individual litigant by pre-
suming good faith on the part of the union. See 65 MICH. L. REV. 373, 375 & n.12
(1966).
34 386 U.S. at 184; see text accompanying note 48 infra.
35 386 U.S. at 188 & n.12. It could be asserted that NLRB jurisdiction was negated
by the Court by the following discussion of remedies: "These remedy problems are dif-
ficult enough when one tribunal has all parties before it; they are impossible if two
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It appears that the Court relied on an extension of the state
court's jurisdiction under section 301 to deny administrative pre-
emption in the instant case. The state court's reliance on the Gon-
zales36 rationale could not be justified. It appears that the Local
100, United Association of Journeymen v. Borden 7 modification of
Gonzales would make the "peripheral" exception to Garmon inap-
plicable in the instant case since the Vaca Court relied heavily on
employment factors. 8 Furthermore, the application of the "vio-
lence" exception to Garmon39 would be inappropriate, considering
the absence of violence in the instant case. Hence, with these judi-
cial exceptions to Garmon seemingly inapplicable in the Vaca case,
it appears that the Court could have justifiably vested jurisdiction in
the state court only by finding section 301 jurisdiction, unless it can
be implied that the Court totally negated NLRB jurisdiction of the
union conduct.40
In order to have absorbed the fair representation duty into sec-
tion 301 jurisdiction, in view of the facts of the Vaca case, the Court
expanded prior interpretation of this legislation. Humphrey v,
Moore4' had at least established that a suit against a union for
breach of the duty of fair representation was allowable in a state
court where the employer was joined in the action with the union.4"
The nature of the claim in Humphrey and the particular union mis-
conduct asserted can be distinguished from the Vaca case. In the
former, the aggrieved employee alleged that both union and man-
independent tribunals, with different procedures, time limitations, and remedial powers,
must participate." Id. at 188 n.12. It has been suggested that the fact that the state
may provide more relief than the Board does not negate federal preemption. In addi-
tion, the conflict inherent in state law remedies unavailable to the Board strongly sup-
ports federal preemption. See Brief for the NLRB as Amicus Curiae at 18, Vaca v.
Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
36 International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958).
37373 U.S. 690 (1963); see note 17 supra.
38See 65 Mscr-L L. REv. 373, 378-79 (1966), in which the author doubts that the
Court could base its decision on Gonzales. But see 386 U.S. at 199, where the con-
curring opinion states that the majority thought the instant case to be "merely peri-
pheral." However, it appears that the majority merely listed Gonzales as one exception
to Garmon and did not rely on it. Id. at 179.
3 0S ee note 17 supra.
40 The very fact that the Court emphasized section 301 jurisdiction suggests that the
NLRB was not denied its power to handle fair representation suits. See 386 U.S. at
183; note 17 supra. See also note 31 supra.
41375 U.S. 335 (1964). An employee brought suit in a Kentucky state court, pray-
ing for injunctive relief, since he feared that a dovetailing agreement between two firms
would result in his layoff as he was a member of the younger firm.
42 See 386 U.S. at 186; Brief for the NLRB as Amicus Curiae at 22, Vaca v. Sipes,
386 U.S. 171 (1967).
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agement breached the collective bargaining agreement since neither
had the power to make the dovetailing decision.43 In addition, the
worker alleged that this collective bargaining decision was obtained
as a result of union deceit. Therefore, the union also breached its
duty of fair representation.44
Some commentators assert that the employee based his claim
against both union and management on the enforcement of the col-
lective bargaining agreement.45 Of most interest, the Vaca Court
itself suggests that it was presented with a different factual situation
than that posed in Humphrey.48 The Court thus seems to make a
significant extension of the Humphrey rule: The union need not
cause the alleged breach of contract by the employer, the direct al-
legation against the union need not include an allegation against
it for breach of contract, and the employer and union need not be
joined.4" All that seems to be required to vest section 301 jurisdic-
tion in a state court is an allegation against a union for breach of
fair representation when the union's fair representation issue may
4 3 Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 342 (1964).
44 Id. at 342-43. No fraud was charged against the employer, and but for the union
misconduct, the employer would have retained the employee. Id. at 343; see Brief
for the NLRB as Amicus Curiae at 22, Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967), wherein
it is shown that in Vaca, the alleged unfair representation occurred after the alleged
wrongful discharge by the employer.
45 See Note, Labor Law: Section 301 and the Union's Duty of Fair Representation,
12 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1238, 1241 (1965); Note, Refusal to Process a Grievance, The
NLRB, and the Duty of Fair Representation, 26 U. Prrr. L. REV. 593, 610 (1965).
4 6 Speaking in hypothetical terminology, as if both employer and union were liable,
the Court stated in reversing the state court's award of damages:
[I]n particular, may an award against a union include, as it did here, damages
attributable solely to the employer's breach of contract? We think not.
Though the union has violated a statutory duty in failing to press the griev-
ance, it is the employer's unrelated breach of contract which triggered the
controversy and which caused this portion of the employee's damages. 386
U.S. at 196-97 (emphasis added).
In addition, the Court stated:
We are not dealing here with situations where a union has affirmatively caused
the employer to commit the alleged breach of contract .... Even if this ap-
proach would be appropriate for analogous § 301 and breach of duty suits,
it is not applicable here, [slince the Union played no part in Swift's alleged
breach of contract .... Id. at 197 n.18 (emphasis added).
47 It appears that the Vaca Court would not require joinder of management with the
union since Owens' employer is not before the Court. The Vaca Court stated, "And, inso-
far as adjudication of the union's breach of duty is concerned, the result [of Humphrey]
should be no different if the employee, as Owens did here, sues the employer and union
in separate actions." 386 U.S. at 187; see note 6 supra & accompanying text. How-
ever, the Court seems to qualify its prior language by asserting, in its damage discussion,
"in fact, the employer may be (and probably should be) joined as a defendant in the
fair representation suit." 386 U.S. at 197 (emphasis added).
6AIR UNION REPRESENTATION
be involved in the separate action against the employer for breach
of contract pending in a state court.
In its discussion of section 301 jurisdiction, the Court also may
have created a new rule of law. After it asserted that the em-
ployee's rights are not endangered by demanding a showing of lack
of good faith by the union,4" the Court went on to declare, "we
think the wrongfully discharged employee may bring an action
against his employer.., provided the employee can prove that the
union as bargaining agent breached its duty of fair representation
in its handling of the employee's grievance."4 Prior to the Court's
disposition of the matter, it had been established that the employee
must, at least, attempt to utilize the grievance procedure and give
the union an opportunity to act on his behalf.5" If the Court's as-
sertion is to be treated as a new rule of law, a conflict between the
circuit courts may have been resolved.51
It has been suggested that such a rule would strengthen the col-
lective bargaining process and thereby promote industrial peace
since the employer, realizing that the union's conduct could be re-
lied on as a defense to his own conduct, would be more likely to
acquiesce to the union as sole representative of the workers, rather
than hear independent individual claims.5" On the other hand, this
4 8 See note 1 supra.
49 386 U.S. at 186; see note 33 supra & accompanying text. The Court would not
apply the rule by which the employer is estopped by his own conduct from repudiating
the contractual procedures. Id. at 185. Although the Court's statement might be con-
sidered dictum, since the suit against the employer is still pending in the state court, it
gives every indication of applying to the present employee. As the concurring opinion
notes: "I do not believe the Court relieves this injustice [to leave the employee without
a remedy when the union wrongfully refuses to process his grievancel ... by requiring
the employee to prove an unfair labor practice as a prerequisite to judicial relief for
the employer's breach of contract." Id. at 200 n.3 (emphasis added). Furthermore,
Mr. Justice Black states, "The Court today opens slightly the courthouse door to an em-
ployee's incidental claim against his union .... This result follows from the Court's
announcement ... of a new rule to govern an employee's suit against his employer."
Id. at 203 (dissenting opinion) (emphasis added).
50 Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652-53 (1965). In this case the
employee bypassed the union entirely.
51 In a pre-Maddox decision, the Fourth Circuit relying upon Cox, Rights Under a
Labor Agreement, 69 HARV. L REv. 601, 630-34 (1956), stated that individuals must
be bound to the grievance procedure and the only exception whereby an employee could
gain relief against his employer is where the union arbitrarily discriminates. See Hen-
derson v. Eastern Gas & Fuel Ass'n, 290 F.2d 677, 681 (1961). But see Brown v.
Sterling Aluminum Prods., Inc., 365 F.2d 651 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S.
957 (1967), where the court, in a post-Maddox opinion suggests that it is only neces-
sary for the employee to seek out the union and afford it an opportunity to act on his
behalf.
5 2 See Cox, Individual Enforcement of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 8 LAB.
UJ. 850 (1957); Cox, supra note 51, at 630-34.
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new rule would raise the possibility that an employer could breach
the contract, and yet, if the union was found to have acted in good
faith, the employee's claim could not be heard "by a jury, nor by an
arbitrator, nor by the employer, nor by the union."'"
The instant case may well implement the Court's current trend
to provide the best of two forums by which an individual employee
can assert his claim and yet promote the philosophy of the Taft-
Hartley Act - the establishment of industrial peace between labor
and management for the benefit of the public which desires stable
relations between employer and representative. Since the Court
does not appear to have negated NLRB jurisdiction of an employee's
grievance against his union for unfair representation, the individual
worker has the benefit of administrative decisionmaking - exper-
tise without the expense of court procedure54 - as long as the de-
cision is not denied enforcement upon appropriate judicial review.
If state jurisdiction of the matter has been vested, the employee has
the advantage of controlling his own suit, gaining unlimited dam-
ages if properly apportioned between union and management, and
avoiding the unreviewable discretion of the General Counsel."
However, the employee would be subject to the presumption of
good faith in favor of the union in handling his grievance.
It also seems that the Vaca decision extends a good faith pre-
sumption in favor of the employer, since he can rely on the union's
good faith conduct in handling the complaint. Although there
could be instances where the employee has obviously been wrong-
fully discharged and the union would still be found to have acted
in good faith, these instances would appear to be too infrequent to
require a contrary exhaustion of remedies rule against the employer.
If such a rule were required, the public interest in stable labor rela-
tions would be thwarted. Hence the Vaca Court, by providing an
additional forum for the worker and at the same time stabilizing
industrial relations, has properly achieved a workable solution.
GERALD RUBIN
53 386 U.S. at 209 (dissenting opinion).
54 65 MIcH. L. REv. 373, 381 (1966).
551d. at 381-82.
